Sweden’s NATO Bid: A Balancing Act with Its Kurdish Community

by Neville Teller

Sweden’s aspiration to join NATO has been put into sharp focus by the demands of Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Turkish leader, who effectively holds veto power over Sweden’s NATO membership, presses Sweden to take stern actions against its Kurdish community. This demand confronts Sweden’s widely respected humanitarian principles and tolerant, liberal society.

This challenging situation started to unfold when Sweden and Finland decided to apply for NATO membership amidst rising concerns over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in May 2022. While the move was generally appreciated as strategic, it triggered unease amongst Sweden’s Kurdish population. For them, NATO signifies Turkey, a long-standing NATO member battling Kurdish separatists domestically and along its borders with Syria and Iran for several years.

Although Sweden took the contentious step of extraditing a Turkish citizen convicted of drug-related charges in Turkey in June, Erdogan remains unconvinced. He has recently lifted his opposition against Finland’s NATO application but continues to block Sweden’s bid. His criticism, often pointed, targets Sweden as a supposed “playground” for terrorist organizations, implying the presence of such elements even within Sweden’s parliament.

The pointed barbs are thought to be directed towards Amineh Kakabaveh, a Swedish parliamentarian of Kurdish origin, who is an ardent supporter of Kurdish self-determination in the Middle East and a vocal critic of Erdogan.

Erdogan’s vehement stance against the Kurds, who constitute approximately 20% of Turkey’s 84 million populace, is rooted in his belief that extremist Kurdish nationalists pose a significant threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. He has outlawed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group established in 1978 advocating Kurdish independence and occasionally resorting to armed aggression, and has fought against PKK-associated groups in northern Syria and Iraq.

Sweden, while condemning terrorist activities, hosts the People’s Protection Units (YPG), who fought alongside US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS between 2014 and 2019. Sweden also recognizes the YPG’s political wing, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which has an office in Stockholm. This situation has led Erdogan to assert that Sweden is a safe haven for elements of the PKK, disguised under the umbrella of the YPG and the PYD.

Sweden’s commitment to its Kurdish community, which is well integrated into its society, is an intrinsic part of its national ethos. The nation hosts around 100,000 Kurds, many of whom have sought refuge from political oppression in the past half-century. This situation presents a complex problem for Sweden as the nation wrestles with its deep-rooted neutrality, commitment to its Kurdish population, and strategic desire to join NATO.

The upcoming NATO summit on July 10th, which addresses crucial issues such as Russia’s illegal occupation of parts of Ukraine, had hoped to celebrate the addition of two new members, namely Sweden and Finland. However, Erdogan’s continued opposition to Sweden’s application has hampered these plans.

Sweden now grapples with a challenging question: should it compromise its commitment to the Kurds and their quest for independence or autonomy for the strategic benefits of NATO membership? This conundrum reflects a broader concern among Swedes, who question the moral implications of conceding to Erdogan’s demands. If the cost of NATO membership is the betrayal of their Kurdish community, many Swedes believe it is too steep.

Ultimately, Sweden’s predicament rests in determining how far it should go in placating Erdogan’s demands against its Kurdish population. If it decides against it, Sweden, NATO, and the Western world may have to accept a scenario in which Sweden.

The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review.  His latest book is: “Trump and the Holy Land:  2016-2020”.  Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com