Published On: Tue, Oct 11th, 2016

Oliver Hart, US Jewish Professor, Shares Nobel Prize in Economics

A Jewish professor of economics has won half of this year's Nobel Prize in Economics.

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A Jewish professor of economics at Harvard University, Oliver Hart, has won half of this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics. The other half goes to Bengt Holmstrom of Finland, with whom he worked together on contract theory: the concept of how contracts enable people to deal with conflicting interests.

Hart’s great-grandfather, Samuel Montague, was an Orthodox Jew who was a member of the House of Commons for 15 years. Montague then received a peerage, and became the first Baron Swaythling.

Oliver Hart was born to Jewish family. His father Philip D’Arcy Hart, was a famous British medical researcher and pioneer in the field of tuberculosis treatment. His mother Ruth Mayer, was gynecologist. Oliver’s grand-grandfather was Samuel Montagu, 1st Baron Swaythling.

Hart is married to writer Rita B. Goldberg, a Harvard literature professor and author of the second-generation Holocaust memoir “Motherland: Growing Up With the Holocaust.” They have two sons and two grandsons.

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences which awards the prize wrote that Hart, 68, “made fundamental contributions to a new branch of contract theory that deals with the important case of incomplete contracts. Because it is impossible for a contract to specify every eventuality, this branch of the theory spells out optimal allocations of control rights: which party to the contract should be entitled to make decisions in which circumstances?

The Academy  added“Hart’s findings on incomplete contracts have shed new light on the ownership and control of businesses and have had a vast impact on several fields of economics, as well as political science and law. His research provides us with new theoretical tools for studying questions such as which kinds of companies should merge, the proper mix of debt and equity financing, and when institutions such as schools or prisons ought to be privately or publicly owned, ” the Academy wrote.

 

The long and the short of contracts

“Modern economies are held together by innumerable contracts. The new theoretical tools created by Hart and Holmström are valuable to the understanding of real-life contracts and institutions, as well as potential pitfalls in contract design.

Society’s many contractual relationships include those between shareholders and top executive management, an insurance company and car owners, or a public authority and its suppliers. As such relationships typically entail conflicts of interest, contracts must be properly designed to ensure that the parties take mutually beneficial decisions. This year’s laureates have developed contract theory, a comprehensive framework for analysing many diverse issues in contractual design, like performance-based pay for top executives, deductibles and co-pays in insurance, and the privatisation of public-sector activities.

In the late 1970s, Bengt Holmström demonstrated how a principal (e.g., a company’s shareholders) should design an optimal contract for an agent (the company’s CEO), whose action is partly unobserved by the principal. Holmström’s informativeness principle stated precisely how this contract should link the agent’s pay to performance-relevant information. Using the basic principal-agent model, he showed how the optimal contract carefully weighs risks against incentives. In later work, Holmström generalised these results to more realistic settings, namely: when employees are not only rewarded with pay, but also with potential promotion; when agents expend effort on many tasks, while principals observe only some dimensions of performance; and when individual members of a team can free-ride on the efforts of others.

In the mid-1980s, Oliver Hart made fundamental contri-butions to a new branch of contract theory that deals with the important case of incomplete contracts. Because it is impossible for a contract to specify every eventuality, this branch of the theory spells out optimal allocations of control rights: which party to the contract should be entitled to make decisions in which circumstances? Hart’s findings on incomplete contracts have shed new light on the ownership and control of businesses and have had a vast impact on several fields of economics, as well as political science and law. His research provides us with new theoretical tools for studying questions such as which kinds of companies should merge, the proper mix of debt and equity financing, and when institutions such as schools or prisons ought to be privately or publicly owned.

Through their initial contributions, Hart and Holmström launched contract theory as a fertile field of basic research. Over the last few decades, they have also explored many of its applications. Their analysis of optimal contractual arrangements lays an intellectual foundation for designing policies and institutions in many areas, from bankruptcy legislation to political constitutions.”

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